April 29, 2026
This decision arose within a long-running construction dispute between a contractor and a homeowner, both acting without legal representation. The financial issues were heavily dependent on expert quantity surveying evidence. Following earlier judgments in 2025, the Court had already revoked the plaintiff’s permission to rely on its expert, Mr Jones, pending further application supported by a “full and frank” affidavit explaining his conduct and disclosing all relevant communications with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff applied to reinstate Mr Jones’s evidence and sought additional relief, including the striking out of the defendant’s case and criticism of the defendant’s expert. Central to the application was Mr Jones’s affidavit. The Court found that the affidavit failed to comply with its earlier directions: it did not exhibit communications, contained an incomplete and inaccurate schedule of correspondence, and omitted any meaningful account of extensive oral and informal contact between Mr Jones and the plaintiff’s director. Subsequent document uploads only magnified those deficiencies.
The Court undertook a detailed examination of the expert process and concluded that Mr Jones had repeatedly communicated with the plaintiff instead of engaging with the opposing expert, and that his proposed amendments to draft joint reports amounted to submissions advancing the plaintiff’s case rather than independent expert opinion. In doing so, he had crossed the line into advocacy and allowed himself to appear — and act — as part of the plaintiff’s litigation team.
Applying Practice Direction RC 17/09 and established authority on expert independence, including Styles v Attorney General and Liverpool Roman Catholic Archdiocesan Trustees v Goldberg (No 3), the Master held that Mr Jones’s evidence was inadmissible. The defect was not merely technical: a reasonable observer would conclude that the expert’s independence had been compromised. No lesser measure, including admission on terms, was appropriate given the nature of the conduct and the selective disclosure.
The plaintiff’s remaining applications were dismissed, and the case was directed to trial on the basis of the defendant’s expert evidence alone.
The judgment reinforces that expert independence is a substantive requirement, not a formality. Experts must avoid informal alignment with the instructing party and must document and disclose all relevant communications. Parties who seek to advance their case through an expert risk wholesale exclusion of that evidence, with potentially decisive consequences for the litigation.
This decision arose within a long-running construction dispute between a contractor and a homeowner, both acting without legal representation. The financial issues were heavily dependent on expert quantity surveying evidence. Following earlier judgments in 2025, the Court had already revoked the plaintiff’s permission to rely on its expert, Mr Jones, pending further application supported by a “full and frank” affidavit explaining his conduct and disclosing all relevant communications with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff applied to reinstate Mr Jones’s evidence and sought additional relief, including the striking out of the defendant’s case and criticism of the defendant’s expert. Central to the application was Mr Jones’s affidavit. The Court found that the affidavit failed to comply with its earlier directions: it did not exhibit communications, contained an incomplete and inaccurate schedule of correspondence, and omitted any meaningful account of extensive oral and informal contact between Mr Jones and the plaintiff’s director. Subsequent document uploads only magnified those deficiencies.
The Court undertook a detailed examination of the expert process and concluded that Mr Jones had repeatedly communicated with the plaintiff instead of engaging with the opposing expert, and that his proposed amendments to draft joint reports amounted to submissions advancing the plaintiff’s case rather than independent expert opinion. In doing so, he had crossed the line into advocacy and allowed himself to appear — and act — as part of the plaintiff’s litigation team.
Applying Practice Direction RC 17/09 and established authority on expert independence, including Styles v Attorney General and Liverpool Roman Catholic Archdiocesan Trustees v Goldberg (No 3), the Master held that Mr Jones’s evidence was inadmissible. The defect was not merely technical: a reasonable observer would conclude that the expert’s independence had been compromised. No lesser measure, including admission on terms, was appropriate given the nature of the conduct and the selective disclosure.
The plaintiff’s remaining applications were dismissed, and the case was directed to trial on the basis of the defendant’s expert evidence alone.
The judgment reinforces that expert independence is a substantive requirement, not a formality. Experts must avoid informal alignment with the instructing party and must document and disclose all relevant communications. Parties who seek to advance their case through an expert risk wholesale exclusion of that evidence, with potentially decisive consequences for the litigation.
This decision arose within a long-running construction dispute between a contractor and a homeowner, both acting without legal representation. The financial issues were heavily dependent on expert quantity surveying evidence. Following earlier judgments in 2025, the Court had already revoked the plaintiff’s permission to rely on its expert, Mr Jones, pending further application supported by a “full and frank” affidavit explaining his conduct and disclosing all relevant communications with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff applied to reinstate Mr Jones’s evidence and sought additional relief, including the striking out of the defendant’s case and criticism of the defendant’s expert. Central to the application was Mr Jones’s affidavit. The Court found that the affidavit failed to comply with its earlier directions: it did not exhibit communications, contained an incomplete and inaccurate schedule of correspondence, and omitted any meaningful account of extensive oral and informal contact between Mr Jones and the plaintiff’s director. Subsequent document uploads only magnified those deficiencies.
The Court undertook a detailed examination of the expert process and concluded that Mr Jones had repeatedly communicated with the plaintiff instead of engaging with the opposing expert, and that his proposed amendments to draft joint reports amounted to submissions advancing the plaintiff’s case rather than independent expert opinion. In doing so, he had crossed the line into advocacy and allowed himself to appear — and act — as part of the plaintiff’s litigation team.
Applying Practice Direction RC 17/09 and established authority on expert independence, including Styles v Attorney General and Liverpool Roman Catholic Archdiocesan Trustees v Goldberg (No 3), the Master held that Mr Jones’s evidence was inadmissible. The defect was not merely technical: a reasonable observer would conclude that the expert’s independence had been compromised. No lesser measure, including admission on terms, was appropriate given the nature of the conduct and the selective disclosure.
The plaintiff’s remaining applications were dismissed, and the case was directed to trial on the basis of the defendant’s expert evidence alone.
The judgment reinforces that expert independence is a substantive requirement, not a formality. Experts must avoid informal alignment with the instructing party and must document and disclose all relevant communications. Parties who seek to advance their case through an expert risk wholesale exclusion of that evidence, with potentially decisive consequences for the litigation.
This decision arose within a long-running construction dispute between a contractor and a homeowner, both acting without legal representation. The financial issues were heavily dependent on expert quantity surveying evidence. Following earlier judgments in 2025, the Court had already revoked the plaintiff’s permission to rely on its expert, Mr Jones, pending further application supported by a “full and frank” affidavit explaining his conduct and disclosing all relevant communications with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff applied to reinstate Mr Jones’s evidence and sought additional relief, including the striking out of the defendant’s case and criticism of the defendant’s expert. Central to the application was Mr Jones’s affidavit. The Court found that the affidavit failed to comply with its earlier directions: it did not exhibit communications, contained an incomplete and inaccurate schedule of correspondence, and omitted any meaningful account of extensive oral and informal contact between Mr Jones and the plaintiff’s director. Subsequent document uploads only magnified those deficiencies.
The Court undertook a detailed examination of the expert process and concluded that Mr Jones had repeatedly communicated with the plaintiff instead of engaging with the opposing expert, and that his proposed amendments to draft joint reports amounted to submissions advancing the plaintiff’s case rather than independent expert opinion. In doing so, he had crossed the line into advocacy and allowed himself to appear — and act — as part of the plaintiff’s litigation team.
Applying Practice Direction RC 17/09 and established authority on expert independence, including Styles v Attorney General and Liverpool Roman Catholic Archdiocesan Trustees v Goldberg (No 3), the Master held that Mr Jones’s evidence was inadmissible. The defect was not merely technical: a reasonable observer would conclude that the expert’s independence had been compromised. No lesser measure, including admission on terms, was appropriate given the nature of the conduct and the selective disclosure.
The plaintiff’s remaining applications were dismissed, and the case was directed to trial on the basis of the defendant’s expert evidence alone.
The judgment reinforces that expert independence is a substantive requirement, not a formality. Experts must avoid informal alignment with the instructing party and must document and disclose all relevant communications. Parties who seek to advance their case through an expert risk wholesale exclusion of that evidence, with potentially decisive consequences for the litigation.