November 10, 2025
In this case, the Plaintiff sought £744,774.57 from the Defendant pursuant to a deed of indemnity dated 14th April 2014 (the Deed). The Deed was intended to cover legal costs incurred by the Claimant in its capacity as trustee of the Tchenguiz Discretionary Trust (of which the Defendant was a beneficiary of) in various Guernsey proceedings.
Although the Deed appeared to be signed by the Defendant, expert handwriting evidence confirmed that the signature was not the Defendant’s. The Court found that the signature was made by the Defendant’s personal assistant who had impersonated his signature on other occasions. The Court held that the Defendant’s personal assistant had actual authority to sign the Deed on behalf of the Defendant or alternatively, that the Defendant was estopped from denying its validity due to representations made and his silence in the face of the Claimant’s reliance.
The Deed was governed by English Law and as such the Court accepted expert evidence that even if a document, such as the Deed failed to meet the formal requirements of a deed under the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, it was enforceable as a contract if it was supported by consideration. In this case, the Court held that the Claimant’s continued participation in litigation in Guernsey and incurring further legal costs represented sufficient consideration for English law purposes.
The Defendant subsequently sought to argue that a consent order entered into in the Royal Court of Guernsey by the Defendant and the Claimant settling the Claimant’s claim against the Tchenguiz Discretionary Trust for £1.2million extinguished any further liability under the Deed. The Court rejected this, finding that the consent order settled only the Claimant’s claim against the trust assets and did not affect its separate personal claim against the Defendant.
On quantum, the Court held that the Claimant was entitled to appropriate the £1.2m first towards its fees as trustee, but that both the trustee fees and legal costs claimed under the Deed must be subject to assessment. The Court expressed concern over the accuracy of the Claimant’s figures, noting a late-stage reduction of over £500,000 in the claimed legal costs and inconsistencies in the treatment of costs incurred personally versus in a fiduciary capacity.
The Court concluded that the Deed was enforceable against the Defendant either as a deed or a contract, and order further proceedings to assess the appropriate quantum.
In this case, the Plaintiff sought £744,774.57 from the Defendant pursuant to a deed of indemnity dated 14th April 2014 (the Deed). The Deed was intended to cover legal costs incurred by the Claimant in its capacity as trustee of the Tchenguiz Discretionary Trust (of which the Defendant was a beneficiary of) in various Guernsey proceedings.
Although the Deed appeared to be signed by the Defendant, expert handwriting evidence confirmed that the signature was not the Defendant’s. The Court found that the signature was made by the Defendant’s personal assistant who had impersonated his signature on other occasions. The Court held that the Defendant’s personal assistant had actual authority to sign the Deed on behalf of the Defendant or alternatively, that the Defendant was estopped from denying its validity due to representations made and his silence in the face of the Claimant’s reliance.
The Deed was governed by English Law and as such the Court accepted expert evidence that even if a document, such as the Deed failed to meet the formal requirements of a deed under the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, it was enforceable as a contract if it was supported by consideration. In this case, the Court held that the Claimant’s continued participation in litigation in Guernsey and incurring further legal costs represented sufficient consideration for English law purposes.
The Defendant subsequently sought to argue that a consent order entered into in the Royal Court of Guernsey by the Defendant and the Claimant settling the Claimant’s claim against the Tchenguiz Discretionary Trust for £1.2million extinguished any further liability under the Deed. The Court rejected this, finding that the consent order settled only the Claimant’s claim against the trust assets and did not affect its separate personal claim against the Defendant.
On quantum, the Court held that the Claimant was entitled to appropriate the £1.2m first towards its fees as trustee, but that both the trustee fees and legal costs claimed under the Deed must be subject to assessment. The Court expressed concern over the accuracy of the Claimant’s figures, noting a late-stage reduction of over £500,000 in the claimed legal costs and inconsistencies in the treatment of costs incurred personally versus in a fiduciary capacity.
The Court concluded that the Deed was enforceable against the Defendant either as a deed or a contract, and order further proceedings to assess the appropriate quantum.
In this case, the Plaintiff sought £744,774.57 from the Defendant pursuant to a deed of indemnity dated 14th April 2014 (the Deed). The Deed was intended to cover legal costs incurred by the Claimant in its capacity as trustee of the Tchenguiz Discretionary Trust (of which the Defendant was a beneficiary of) in various Guernsey proceedings.
Although the Deed appeared to be signed by the Defendant, expert handwriting evidence confirmed that the signature was not the Defendant’s. The Court found that the signature was made by the Defendant’s personal assistant who had impersonated his signature on other occasions. The Court held that the Defendant’s personal assistant had actual authority to sign the Deed on behalf of the Defendant or alternatively, that the Defendant was estopped from denying its validity due to representations made and his silence in the face of the Claimant’s reliance.
The Deed was governed by English Law and as such the Court accepted expert evidence that even if a document, such as the Deed failed to meet the formal requirements of a deed under the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, it was enforceable as a contract if it was supported by consideration. In this case, the Court held that the Claimant’s continued participation in litigation in Guernsey and incurring further legal costs represented sufficient consideration for English law purposes.
The Defendant subsequently sought to argue that a consent order entered into in the Royal Court of Guernsey by the Defendant and the Claimant settling the Claimant’s claim against the Tchenguiz Discretionary Trust for £1.2million extinguished any further liability under the Deed. The Court rejected this, finding that the consent order settled only the Claimant’s claim against the trust assets and did not affect its separate personal claim against the Defendant.
On quantum, the Court held that the Claimant was entitled to appropriate the £1.2m first towards its fees as trustee, but that both the trustee fees and legal costs claimed under the Deed must be subject to assessment. The Court expressed concern over the accuracy of the Claimant’s figures, noting a late-stage reduction of over £500,000 in the claimed legal costs and inconsistencies in the treatment of costs incurred personally versus in a fiduciary capacity.
The Court concluded that the Deed was enforceable against the Defendant either as a deed or a contract, and order further proceedings to assess the appropriate quantum.
In this case, the Plaintiff sought £744,774.57 from the Defendant pursuant to a deed of indemnity dated 14th April 2014 (the Deed). The Deed was intended to cover legal costs incurred by the Claimant in its capacity as trustee of the Tchenguiz Discretionary Trust (of which the Defendant was a beneficiary of) in various Guernsey proceedings.
Although the Deed appeared to be signed by the Defendant, expert handwriting evidence confirmed that the signature was not the Defendant’s. The Court found that the signature was made by the Defendant’s personal assistant who had impersonated his signature on other occasions. The Court held that the Defendant’s personal assistant had actual authority to sign the Deed on behalf of the Defendant or alternatively, that the Defendant was estopped from denying its validity due to representations made and his silence in the face of the Claimant’s reliance.
The Deed was governed by English Law and as such the Court accepted expert evidence that even if a document, such as the Deed failed to meet the formal requirements of a deed under the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, it was enforceable as a contract if it was supported by consideration. In this case, the Court held that the Claimant’s continued participation in litigation in Guernsey and incurring further legal costs represented sufficient consideration for English law purposes.
The Defendant subsequently sought to argue that a consent order entered into in the Royal Court of Guernsey by the Defendant and the Claimant settling the Claimant’s claim against the Tchenguiz Discretionary Trust for £1.2million extinguished any further liability under the Deed. The Court rejected this, finding that the consent order settled only the Claimant’s claim against the trust assets and did not affect its separate personal claim against the Defendant.
On quantum, the Court held that the Claimant was entitled to appropriate the £1.2m first towards its fees as trustee, but that both the trustee fees and legal costs claimed under the Deed must be subject to assessment. The Court expressed concern over the accuracy of the Claimant’s figures, noting a late-stage reduction of over £500,000 in the claimed legal costs and inconsistencies in the treatment of costs incurred personally versus in a fiduciary capacity.
The Court concluded that the Deed was enforceable against the Defendant either as a deed or a contract, and order further proceedings to assess the appropriate quantum.