April 29, 2026
The decision arose out of shareholder and unfair prejudice proceedings following a private equity investment in Friend Media Technology Systems Limited (the Company). Under an English law governed investment agreement, the second to fourth defendants (the NEC Parties) acquired a majority shareholding in the Company. The plaintiffs alleged that, notwithstanding ‘no partnership’ and ‘entire agreement’ clauses, the parties had operated on the basis of a partnership understanding, rendering the Company a quasi partnership for the purposes of unfair prejudice relief.
The NEC Parties applied for summary judgment to strike out those allegations, relying inter alia on the express terms of the investment agreement. In support of that application, they filed a written opinion from leading English counsel addressing the interpretation and effect of entire agreement and no partnership clauses under English law. The plaintiffs responded by seeking to exclude the opinion, contending that expert evidence was either impermissible on a summary judgment application, or alternatively that leave of the Court was required and had not been obtained.
The Master rejected those submissions, holding that expert evidence may be adduced on summary judgment, that no leave was required under the Royal Court Rules, and that the opinion was admissible. The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the Court approached the matter de novo. It held that Rule 6/20(2)(d) of the Royal Court Rules does not require a party to obtain permission to adduce expert evidence; rather, it empowers the Court to limit the number of experts, not to exclude expert evidence altogether. The Jersey rules were contrasted with CPR 35.4, which expressly imposes a permission requirement in England and Wales.
However, the absence of a permission requirement did not resolve the matter. The decisive issue was admissibility. Applying settled principles, the Court held that expert evidence is admissible only where it is necessary to assist the Court on matters outside its own knowledge and experience. While foreign law is generally a question of fact requiring expert evidence, English law occupies a special position in Jersey litigation. Given the close alignment between English and Jersey law, and the Court’s routine engagement with English authorities, expert evidence is unnecessary unless the case raises highly technical or specialised issues.
In this case, the opinion addressed general principles of contractual interpretation and the effect of entire agreement and no partnership clauses—areas in which Jersey courts are fully equipped to form their own judgment with the assistance of legal submissions. The evidence was therefore unnecessary and inadmissible. As a result, the appeal was allowed and the summary judgment application was to proceed without reliance on the English law opinion.
In a notable postscript, the Court expressed reservations about the current procedural framework and suggested that Jersey would benefit from a rule equivalent to CPR 35.4, requiring prior permission before any expert evidence may be adduced.
The decision underscores that expert evidence—particularly on English law—will be admitted only where strictly necessary, even at interlocutory stages. While leave is not required under the existing rules, parties who deploy expert opinions unnecessarily risk exclusion and wasted costs. The judgment also highlights a developing judicial appetite for tighter procedural control of expert evidence in Jersey.
The decision arose out of shareholder and unfair prejudice proceedings following a private equity investment in Friend Media Technology Systems Limited (the Company). Under an English law governed investment agreement, the second to fourth defendants (the NEC Parties) acquired a majority shareholding in the Company. The plaintiffs alleged that, notwithstanding ‘no partnership’ and ‘entire agreement’ clauses, the parties had operated on the basis of a partnership understanding, rendering the Company a quasi partnership for the purposes of unfair prejudice relief.
The NEC Parties applied for summary judgment to strike out those allegations, relying inter alia on the express terms of the investment agreement. In support of that application, they filed a written opinion from leading English counsel addressing the interpretation and effect of entire agreement and no partnership clauses under English law. The plaintiffs responded by seeking to exclude the opinion, contending that expert evidence was either impermissible on a summary judgment application, or alternatively that leave of the Court was required and had not been obtained.
The Master rejected those submissions, holding that expert evidence may be adduced on summary judgment, that no leave was required under the Royal Court Rules, and that the opinion was admissible. The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the Court approached the matter de novo. It held that Rule 6/20(2)(d) of the Royal Court Rules does not require a party to obtain permission to adduce expert evidence; rather, it empowers the Court to limit the number of experts, not to exclude expert evidence altogether. The Jersey rules were contrasted with CPR 35.4, which expressly imposes a permission requirement in England and Wales.
However, the absence of a permission requirement did not resolve the matter. The decisive issue was admissibility. Applying settled principles, the Court held that expert evidence is admissible only where it is necessary to assist the Court on matters outside its own knowledge and experience. While foreign law is generally a question of fact requiring expert evidence, English law occupies a special position in Jersey litigation. Given the close alignment between English and Jersey law, and the Court’s routine engagement with English authorities, expert evidence is unnecessary unless the case raises highly technical or specialised issues.
In this case, the opinion addressed general principles of contractual interpretation and the effect of entire agreement and no partnership clauses—areas in which Jersey courts are fully equipped to form their own judgment with the assistance of legal submissions. The evidence was therefore unnecessary and inadmissible. As a result, the appeal was allowed and the summary judgment application was to proceed without reliance on the English law opinion.
In a notable postscript, the Court expressed reservations about the current procedural framework and suggested that Jersey would benefit from a rule equivalent to CPR 35.4, requiring prior permission before any expert evidence may be adduced.
The decision underscores that expert evidence—particularly on English law—will be admitted only where strictly necessary, even at interlocutory stages. While leave is not required under the existing rules, parties who deploy expert opinions unnecessarily risk exclusion and wasted costs. The judgment also highlights a developing judicial appetite for tighter procedural control of expert evidence in Jersey.
The decision arose out of shareholder and unfair prejudice proceedings following a private equity investment in Friend Media Technology Systems Limited (the Company). Under an English law governed investment agreement, the second to fourth defendants (the NEC Parties) acquired a majority shareholding in the Company. The plaintiffs alleged that, notwithstanding ‘no partnership’ and ‘entire agreement’ clauses, the parties had operated on the basis of a partnership understanding, rendering the Company a quasi partnership for the purposes of unfair prejudice relief.
The NEC Parties applied for summary judgment to strike out those allegations, relying inter alia on the express terms of the investment agreement. In support of that application, they filed a written opinion from leading English counsel addressing the interpretation and effect of entire agreement and no partnership clauses under English law. The plaintiffs responded by seeking to exclude the opinion, contending that expert evidence was either impermissible on a summary judgment application, or alternatively that leave of the Court was required and had not been obtained.
The Master rejected those submissions, holding that expert evidence may be adduced on summary judgment, that no leave was required under the Royal Court Rules, and that the opinion was admissible. The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the Court approached the matter de novo. It held that Rule 6/20(2)(d) of the Royal Court Rules does not require a party to obtain permission to adduce expert evidence; rather, it empowers the Court to limit the number of experts, not to exclude expert evidence altogether. The Jersey rules were contrasted with CPR 35.4, which expressly imposes a permission requirement in England and Wales.
However, the absence of a permission requirement did not resolve the matter. The decisive issue was admissibility. Applying settled principles, the Court held that expert evidence is admissible only where it is necessary to assist the Court on matters outside its own knowledge and experience. While foreign law is generally a question of fact requiring expert evidence, English law occupies a special position in Jersey litigation. Given the close alignment between English and Jersey law, and the Court’s routine engagement with English authorities, expert evidence is unnecessary unless the case raises highly technical or specialised issues.
In this case, the opinion addressed general principles of contractual interpretation and the effect of entire agreement and no partnership clauses—areas in which Jersey courts are fully equipped to form their own judgment with the assistance of legal submissions. The evidence was therefore unnecessary and inadmissible. As a result, the appeal was allowed and the summary judgment application was to proceed without reliance on the English law opinion.
In a notable postscript, the Court expressed reservations about the current procedural framework and suggested that Jersey would benefit from a rule equivalent to CPR 35.4, requiring prior permission before any expert evidence may be adduced.
The decision underscores that expert evidence—particularly on English law—will be admitted only where strictly necessary, even at interlocutory stages. While leave is not required under the existing rules, parties who deploy expert opinions unnecessarily risk exclusion and wasted costs. The judgment also highlights a developing judicial appetite for tighter procedural control of expert evidence in Jersey.
The decision arose out of shareholder and unfair prejudice proceedings following a private equity investment in Friend Media Technology Systems Limited (the Company). Under an English law governed investment agreement, the second to fourth defendants (the NEC Parties) acquired a majority shareholding in the Company. The plaintiffs alleged that, notwithstanding ‘no partnership’ and ‘entire agreement’ clauses, the parties had operated on the basis of a partnership understanding, rendering the Company a quasi partnership for the purposes of unfair prejudice relief.
The NEC Parties applied for summary judgment to strike out those allegations, relying inter alia on the express terms of the investment agreement. In support of that application, they filed a written opinion from leading English counsel addressing the interpretation and effect of entire agreement and no partnership clauses under English law. The plaintiffs responded by seeking to exclude the opinion, contending that expert evidence was either impermissible on a summary judgment application, or alternatively that leave of the Court was required and had not been obtained.
The Master rejected those submissions, holding that expert evidence may be adduced on summary judgment, that no leave was required under the Royal Court Rules, and that the opinion was admissible. The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the Court approached the matter de novo. It held that Rule 6/20(2)(d) of the Royal Court Rules does not require a party to obtain permission to adduce expert evidence; rather, it empowers the Court to limit the number of experts, not to exclude expert evidence altogether. The Jersey rules were contrasted with CPR 35.4, which expressly imposes a permission requirement in England and Wales.
However, the absence of a permission requirement did not resolve the matter. The decisive issue was admissibility. Applying settled principles, the Court held that expert evidence is admissible only where it is necessary to assist the Court on matters outside its own knowledge and experience. While foreign law is generally a question of fact requiring expert evidence, English law occupies a special position in Jersey litigation. Given the close alignment between English and Jersey law, and the Court’s routine engagement with English authorities, expert evidence is unnecessary unless the case raises highly technical or specialised issues.
In this case, the opinion addressed general principles of contractual interpretation and the effect of entire agreement and no partnership clauses—areas in which Jersey courts are fully equipped to form their own judgment with the assistance of legal submissions. The evidence was therefore unnecessary and inadmissible. As a result, the appeal was allowed and the summary judgment application was to proceed without reliance on the English law opinion.
In a notable postscript, the Court expressed reservations about the current procedural framework and suggested that Jersey would benefit from a rule equivalent to CPR 35.4, requiring prior permission before any expert evidence may be adduced.
The decision underscores that expert evidence—particularly on English law—will be admitted only where strictly necessary, even at interlocutory stages. While leave is not required under the existing rules, parties who deploy expert opinions unnecessarily risk exclusion and wasted costs. The judgment also highlights a developing judicial appetite for tighter procedural control of expert evidence in Jersey.