Representation of B re the Puffin Trust: [2026] JRC 233

November 18, 2026

The decision of In the matter of the Puffin Trust is unlikely to break new legal ground in relation to the law of mistake in Trust law. The relevant principles under Articles 11 and 47E of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 have been settled for many years and are readily applied by the Court. The broader significance of this judgment lies elsewhere. It provides a useful reminder of the practical breadth of Jersey’s statutory mistake jurisdiction, highlights the Court’s continuing preference for substance over form in trust applicants, and demonstrates the significant remedial advantages available where a trust structure has been implemented on the basis of defective professional advice.

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The facts were striking. The settlor, originally domiciled outside of the UK, have received long running advice regarding their domicile status from professional advisers.  Acting on that advice, the Puffin Trust was established in April 2018 and the settlor subsequent transferred assets worth approximately £17.3 million into the structure. The rationale was straightforward; the settlor had been advised that they would not become deemed UK domiciled until April 2020 and therefore had time to establish an offshore trust capable of preserving significant UK tax advantages.

‍

The advice turned out to be fundamentally wrong. When undertaking later inheritance tax work, the adviser realised that the settlor’s extensive periods of UK residence before a move overseas in 2000 had been overlooked in earlier calculations. As a consequence, the settlor had in fact been deemed UK domiciled since 6 April 2017, a full year before the trust was established.

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The consequences were dramatic. The evidence before the Court suggested immediate tax exposure of more than £4 million, substantial interest charges, further exit charges, potential future inheritance tax liabilities, and additional capital gains and income tax liabilities. Overall exposure was estimated to exceed £6.5 million before interest and penalties and could increase significantly depending on HMRC’s treatment of the position.

‍

From a legal perspective, the outcome was relatively predictable. The Court found that the settlor had acted under a mistake, that they would not have established and funded the trust but for that mistake, and that the consequences were sufficiently serious to justify relief. Those conclusions comfortably satisfied both the established mistake jurisprudence and the statutory tests contained within Articles 11 and 47E of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984.

‍

What makes the judgment particularly interesting for practitioners is the Court’s treatment of the relationship between the creation of the trust and the transfers into it.  The Court expressly cautioned against drawing artificial distinctions between the establishment of a trust and the transfers of property subsequently made into it. Instead it emphasised that such arrangements should be examined realistically and in the round. In this case, the trust and its funding were described as inextricably linked, with the same operative mistake affecting every stage of the transaction.

‍

That observation may prove more significant than the Court’s application of the mistake test itself.  Trust structures are frequently implemented through a sequence of related steps, sometimes over an extended period. The Court’s approach signals a continued willingness to focus on commercial and practical reality when determining whether relief should be granted. For adviser, the message is that the Court remains concerned with the substance of the transaction rather than technical distinctions between constituent steps where those steps form part of a single plan driven by the same mistaken assumption.

‍

The judgment is also noteworthy for the Court’s comments regarding alternative remedies. The settlor potentially had a claim of professional negligence against her advisers arising from the erroneous advice. However, the Court reiterated what it found in earlier mistake cases: litigation against advisers is not ordinarily a satisfactory substitute where statutory trust remedies are available. Professional negligence proceedings are expensive, uncertain and time consuming. By contrast, the statutory mistake jurisdiction enables the Court, where the relevant criteria are met, to address the problem directly and restore the parties to the position they intended to create.

‍

The decision of In the matter of the Puffin Trust is unlikely to break new legal ground in relation to the law of mistake in Trust law. The relevant principles under Articles 11 and 47E of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 have been settled for many years and are readily applied by the Court. The broader significance of this judgment lies elsewhere. It provides a useful reminder of the practical breadth of Jersey’s statutory mistake jurisdiction, highlights the Court’s continuing preference for substance over form in trust applicants, and demonstrates the significant remedial advantages available where a trust structure has been implemented on the basis of defective professional advice.

‍

The facts were striking. The settlor, originally domiciled outside of the UK, have received long running advice regarding their domicile status from professional advisers.  Acting on that advice, the Puffin Trust was established in April 2018 and the settlor subsequent transferred assets worth approximately £17.3 million into the structure. The rationale was straightforward; the settlor had been advised that they would not become deemed UK domiciled until April 2020 and therefore had time to establish an offshore trust capable of preserving significant UK tax advantages.

‍

The advice turned out to be fundamentally wrong. When undertaking later inheritance tax work, the adviser realised that the settlor’s extensive periods of UK residence before a move overseas in 2000 had been overlooked in earlier calculations. As a consequence, the settlor had in fact been deemed UK domiciled since 6 April 2017, a full year before the trust was established.

‍

The consequences were dramatic. The evidence before the Court suggested immediate tax exposure of more than £4 million, substantial interest charges, further exit charges, potential future inheritance tax liabilities, and additional capital gains and income tax liabilities. Overall exposure was estimated to exceed £6.5 million before interest and penalties and could increase significantly depending on HMRC’s treatment of the position.

‍

From a legal perspective, the outcome was relatively predictable. The Court found that the settlor had acted under a mistake, that they would not have established and funded the trust but for that mistake, and that the consequences were sufficiently serious to justify relief. Those conclusions comfortably satisfied both the established mistake jurisprudence and the statutory tests contained within Articles 11 and 47E of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984.

‍

What makes the judgment particularly interesting for practitioners is the Court’s treatment of the relationship between the creation of the trust and the transfers into it.  The Court expressly cautioned against drawing artificial distinctions between the establishment of a trust and the transfers of property subsequently made into it. Instead it emphasised that such arrangements should be examined realistically and in the round. In this case, the trust and its funding were described as inextricably linked, with the same operative mistake affecting every stage of the transaction.

‍

That observation may prove more significant than the Court’s application of the mistake test itself.  Trust structures are frequently implemented through a sequence of related steps, sometimes over an extended period. The Court’s approach signals a continued willingness to focus on commercial and practical reality when determining whether relief should be granted. For adviser, the message is that the Court remains concerned with the substance of the transaction rather than technical distinctions between constituent steps where those steps form part of a single plan driven by the same mistaken assumption.

‍

The judgment is also noteworthy for the Court’s comments regarding alternative remedies. The settlor potentially had a claim of professional negligence against her advisers arising from the erroneous advice. However, the Court reiterated what it found in earlier mistake cases: litigation against advisers is not ordinarily a satisfactory substitute where statutory trust remedies are available. Professional negligence proceedings are expensive, uncertain and time consuming. By contrast, the statutory mistake jurisdiction enables the Court, where the relevant criteria are met, to address the problem directly and restore the parties to the position they intended to create.

‍

The decision of In the matter of the Puffin Trust is unlikely to break new legal ground in relation to the law of mistake in Trust law. The relevant principles under Articles 11 and 47E of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 have been settled for many years and are readily applied by the Court. The broader significance of this judgment lies elsewhere. It provides a useful reminder of the practical breadth of Jersey’s statutory mistake jurisdiction, highlights the Court’s continuing preference for substance over form in trust applicants, and demonstrates the significant remedial advantages available where a trust structure has been implemented on the basis of defective professional advice.

‍

The facts were striking. The settlor, originally domiciled outside of the UK, have received long running advice regarding their domicile status from professional advisers.  Acting on that advice, the Puffin Trust was established in April 2018 and the settlor subsequent transferred assets worth approximately £17.3 million into the structure. The rationale was straightforward; the settlor had been advised that they would not become deemed UK domiciled until April 2020 and therefore had time to establish an offshore trust capable of preserving significant UK tax advantages.

‍

The advice turned out to be fundamentally wrong. When undertaking later inheritance tax work, the adviser realised that the settlor’s extensive periods of UK residence before a move overseas in 2000 had been overlooked in earlier calculations. As a consequence, the settlor had in fact been deemed UK domiciled since 6 April 2017, a full year before the trust was established.

‍

The consequences were dramatic. The evidence before the Court suggested immediate tax exposure of more than £4 million, substantial interest charges, further exit charges, potential future inheritance tax liabilities, and additional capital gains and income tax liabilities. Overall exposure was estimated to exceed £6.5 million before interest and penalties and could increase significantly depending on HMRC’s treatment of the position.

‍

From a legal perspective, the outcome was relatively predictable. The Court found that the settlor had acted under a mistake, that they would not have established and funded the trust but for that mistake, and that the consequences were sufficiently serious to justify relief. Those conclusions comfortably satisfied both the established mistake jurisprudence and the statutory tests contained within Articles 11 and 47E of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984.

‍

What makes the judgment particularly interesting for practitioners is the Court’s treatment of the relationship between the creation of the trust and the transfers into it.  The Court expressly cautioned against drawing artificial distinctions between the establishment of a trust and the transfers of property subsequently made into it. Instead it emphasised that such arrangements should be examined realistically and in the round. In this case, the trust and its funding were described as inextricably linked, with the same operative mistake affecting every stage of the transaction.

‍

That observation may prove more significant than the Court’s application of the mistake test itself.  Trust structures are frequently implemented through a sequence of related steps, sometimes over an extended period. The Court’s approach signals a continued willingness to focus on commercial and practical reality when determining whether relief should be granted. For adviser, the message is that the Court remains concerned with the substance of the transaction rather than technical distinctions between constituent steps where those steps form part of a single plan driven by the same mistaken assumption.

‍

The judgment is also noteworthy for the Court’s comments regarding alternative remedies. The settlor potentially had a claim of professional negligence against her advisers arising from the erroneous advice. However, the Court reiterated what it found in earlier mistake cases: litigation against advisers is not ordinarily a satisfactory substitute where statutory trust remedies are available. Professional negligence proceedings are expensive, uncertain and time consuming. By contrast, the statutory mistake jurisdiction enables the Court, where the relevant criteria are met, to address the problem directly and restore the parties to the position they intended to create.

‍

The decision of In the matter of the Puffin Trust is unlikely to break new legal ground in relation to the law of mistake in Trust law. The relevant principles under Articles 11 and 47E of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 have been settled for many years and are readily applied by the Court. The broader significance of this judgment lies elsewhere. It provides a useful reminder of the practical breadth of Jersey’s statutory mistake jurisdiction, highlights the Court’s continuing preference for substance over form in trust applicants, and demonstrates the significant remedial advantages available where a trust structure has been implemented on the basis of defective professional advice.

‍

The facts were striking. The settlor, originally domiciled outside of the UK, have received long running advice regarding their domicile status from professional advisers.  Acting on that advice, the Puffin Trust was established in April 2018 and the settlor subsequent transferred assets worth approximately £17.3 million into the structure. The rationale was straightforward; the settlor had been advised that they would not become deemed UK domiciled until April 2020 and therefore had time to establish an offshore trust capable of preserving significant UK tax advantages.

‍

The advice turned out to be fundamentally wrong. When undertaking later inheritance tax work, the adviser realised that the settlor’s extensive periods of UK residence before a move overseas in 2000 had been overlooked in earlier calculations. As a consequence, the settlor had in fact been deemed UK domiciled since 6 April 2017, a full year before the trust was established.

‍

The consequences were dramatic. The evidence before the Court suggested immediate tax exposure of more than £4 million, substantial interest charges, further exit charges, potential future inheritance tax liabilities, and additional capital gains and income tax liabilities. Overall exposure was estimated to exceed £6.5 million before interest and penalties and could increase significantly depending on HMRC’s treatment of the position.

‍

From a legal perspective, the outcome was relatively predictable. The Court found that the settlor had acted under a mistake, that they would not have established and funded the trust but for that mistake, and that the consequences were sufficiently serious to justify relief. Those conclusions comfortably satisfied both the established mistake jurisprudence and the statutory tests contained within Articles 11 and 47E of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984.

‍

What makes the judgment particularly interesting for practitioners is the Court’s treatment of the relationship between the creation of the trust and the transfers into it.  The Court expressly cautioned against drawing artificial distinctions between the establishment of a trust and the transfers of property subsequently made into it. Instead it emphasised that such arrangements should be examined realistically and in the round. In this case, the trust and its funding were described as inextricably linked, with the same operative mistake affecting every stage of the transaction.

‍

That observation may prove more significant than the Court’s application of the mistake test itself.  Trust structures are frequently implemented through a sequence of related steps, sometimes over an extended period. The Court’s approach signals a continued willingness to focus on commercial and practical reality when determining whether relief should be granted. For adviser, the message is that the Court remains concerned with the substance of the transaction rather than technical distinctions between constituent steps where those steps form part of a single plan driven by the same mistaken assumption.

‍

The judgment is also noteworthy for the Court’s comments regarding alternative remedies. The settlor potentially had a claim of professional negligence against her advisers arising from the erroneous advice. However, the Court reiterated what it found in earlier mistake cases: litigation against advisers is not ordinarily a satisfactory substitute where statutory trust remedies are available. Professional negligence proceedings are expensive, uncertain and time consuming. By contrast, the statutory mistake jurisdiction enables the Court, where the relevant criteria are met, to address the problem directly and restore the parties to the position they intended to create.

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