November 17, 2026
This is a significant authority on the interpretation of the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal’s (the Tribunal) recently introduced costs jurisdiction. Whilst the appeal arose from a costs dispute following an unsuccessful unfair dismissal and discrimination claims, its importance extends far beyond the immediate facts. The judgment represents the Court’s consideration of Article 40A of the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal (Procedure) (Jersey) Order 2016 (Article 40A) and establishes the principles that will govern future applications for costs before the Tribunal.
The background to the appeal was unusual. Following the Tribunal’s substantive decision, both parties sought costs under the newly enacted Article 40A. The Tribunal refused both applications. Thereafter the parties settled not only the substantive litigation but also the costs dispute itself. Nevertheless the States Employment Board elected to pursue the appeal on a pure question of law because, as Jersey’s largest employer, it considered clarification of the new costs regime to be a matter of wider public importance.
The appeal focused on two related findings in the Tribunal’s costs decision. First, the Tribunal held that Article 40A created a cost regime that was compensatory and not punitive. Secondly, it held that a party seeking costs was required to demonstrate that it had identifiable wasted costs as a result of the other party’s conduct. These findings led the Tribunal to reject elements of the States Employment Board’s costs claim because the States Employment Board had not isolated and quantified specific wasted expenditure.
The Court held that both propositions were errors of law. The Court considered the language of Article 40A itself. It noted that it permits the Tribunal to only award costs where a party or representative has acted “vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably” in bringing or conducting proceedings. The Court observed that this is fundamentally different from the general costs jurisdiction exercised by the Court in ordinary civil litigation, where costs are commonly awarded to compensate the successful party. In contrast, Article 40A does not confer a general right to recover costs. Rather costs only become available where there has been conduct warranting criticism. For that reason, the Court concluded that the essential purpose of Article 40A is to sanction and deter unreasonable conduct. The trigger for the jurisdiction is not the success or failure in the litigation, but misconduct during the proceedings. The Court expressly noted that a successful party could, in principle, be ordered to pay costs if it had behaved in a manner described in Article 40A. That possibility is difficult to reconcile with a purely compensatory model and strongly supports the conclusion that the regime is intended to regulate behaviour rather than simply reimburse expenditure.
The Court acknowledged that a costs award under Article 40A retains certain compensatory characteristics. Costs must actually have been incurred, the award cannot exceed £10,000.00, and the Tribunal must consider the paying party’s ability to meet the award. However, these features were characterised as limitations on the exercise of the power rather than indicators of its purpose. In the Court’s view they do not alter the fact that the jurisdiction exists principally to punish and deter unacceptable litigation conduct.
In respect of the Tribunal’s requirement that a party must demonstrate wasted costs, the Court emphasised that Article 40A creates an indemnity costs jurisdiction, not a wasted costs jurisdiction. Wasted costs orders are a specialised remedy typically directed against legal representatives whose conduct has unnecessarily increased the costs of litigation. Such orders require a distinct statutory basis and are subject to particular procedural safeguards because of their potentially serious consequences. Article 40A contains no such language and confers no equivalent jurisdiction.
From a practical perspective, this decision is likely to strengthen the effectiveness of the Tribunal’s costs jurisdiction. Parties can no longer assume that costs applications will be confined to reimbursement of specifically identifiable wasted expenditure. Instead the focus will be on whether a party’s conduct reaches the statutory threshold of being vexatious, abusive, disruptive, or otherwise unreasonable. Where that threshold is met, the Tribunal has a broader discretion to impose a costs sanction designed to deter such behaviour in future proceedings.
This is a significant authority on the interpretation of the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal’s (the Tribunal) recently introduced costs jurisdiction. Whilst the appeal arose from a costs dispute following an unsuccessful unfair dismissal and discrimination claims, its importance extends far beyond the immediate facts. The judgment represents the Court’s consideration of Article 40A of the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal (Procedure) (Jersey) Order 2016 (Article 40A) and establishes the principles that will govern future applications for costs before the Tribunal.
The background to the appeal was unusual. Following the Tribunal’s substantive decision, both parties sought costs under the newly enacted Article 40A. The Tribunal refused both applications. Thereafter the parties settled not only the substantive litigation but also the costs dispute itself. Nevertheless the States Employment Board elected to pursue the appeal on a pure question of law because, as Jersey’s largest employer, it considered clarification of the new costs regime to be a matter of wider public importance.
The appeal focused on two related findings in the Tribunal’s costs decision. First, the Tribunal held that Article 40A created a cost regime that was compensatory and not punitive. Secondly, it held that a party seeking costs was required to demonstrate that it had identifiable wasted costs as a result of the other party’s conduct. These findings led the Tribunal to reject elements of the States Employment Board’s costs claim because the States Employment Board had not isolated and quantified specific wasted expenditure.
The Court held that both propositions were errors of law. The Court considered the language of Article 40A itself. It noted that it permits the Tribunal to only award costs where a party or representative has acted “vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably” in bringing or conducting proceedings. The Court observed that this is fundamentally different from the general costs jurisdiction exercised by the Court in ordinary civil litigation, where costs are commonly awarded to compensate the successful party. In contrast, Article 40A does not confer a general right to recover costs. Rather costs only become available where there has been conduct warranting criticism. For that reason, the Court concluded that the essential purpose of Article 40A is to sanction and deter unreasonable conduct. The trigger for the jurisdiction is not the success or failure in the litigation, but misconduct during the proceedings. The Court expressly noted that a successful party could, in principle, be ordered to pay costs if it had behaved in a manner described in Article 40A. That possibility is difficult to reconcile with a purely compensatory model and strongly supports the conclusion that the regime is intended to regulate behaviour rather than simply reimburse expenditure.
The Court acknowledged that a costs award under Article 40A retains certain compensatory characteristics. Costs must actually have been incurred, the award cannot exceed £10,000.00, and the Tribunal must consider the paying party’s ability to meet the award. However, these features were characterised as limitations on the exercise of the power rather than indicators of its purpose. In the Court’s view they do not alter the fact that the jurisdiction exists principally to punish and deter unacceptable litigation conduct.
In respect of the Tribunal’s requirement that a party must demonstrate wasted costs, the Court emphasised that Article 40A creates an indemnity costs jurisdiction, not a wasted costs jurisdiction. Wasted costs orders are a specialised remedy typically directed against legal representatives whose conduct has unnecessarily increased the costs of litigation. Such orders require a distinct statutory basis and are subject to particular procedural safeguards because of their potentially serious consequences. Article 40A contains no such language and confers no equivalent jurisdiction.
From a practical perspective, this decision is likely to strengthen the effectiveness of the Tribunal’s costs jurisdiction. Parties can no longer assume that costs applications will be confined to reimbursement of specifically identifiable wasted expenditure. Instead the focus will be on whether a party’s conduct reaches the statutory threshold of being vexatious, abusive, disruptive, or otherwise unreasonable. Where that threshold is met, the Tribunal has a broader discretion to impose a costs sanction designed to deter such behaviour in future proceedings.
This is a significant authority on the interpretation of the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal’s (the Tribunal) recently introduced costs jurisdiction. Whilst the appeal arose from a costs dispute following an unsuccessful unfair dismissal and discrimination claims, its importance extends far beyond the immediate facts. The judgment represents the Court’s consideration of Article 40A of the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal (Procedure) (Jersey) Order 2016 (Article 40A) and establishes the principles that will govern future applications for costs before the Tribunal.
The background to the appeal was unusual. Following the Tribunal’s substantive decision, both parties sought costs under the newly enacted Article 40A. The Tribunal refused both applications. Thereafter the parties settled not only the substantive litigation but also the costs dispute itself. Nevertheless the States Employment Board elected to pursue the appeal on a pure question of law because, as Jersey’s largest employer, it considered clarification of the new costs regime to be a matter of wider public importance.
The appeal focused on two related findings in the Tribunal’s costs decision. First, the Tribunal held that Article 40A created a cost regime that was compensatory and not punitive. Secondly, it held that a party seeking costs was required to demonstrate that it had identifiable wasted costs as a result of the other party’s conduct. These findings led the Tribunal to reject elements of the States Employment Board’s costs claim because the States Employment Board had not isolated and quantified specific wasted expenditure.
The Court held that both propositions were errors of law. The Court considered the language of Article 40A itself. It noted that it permits the Tribunal to only award costs where a party or representative has acted “vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably” in bringing or conducting proceedings. The Court observed that this is fundamentally different from the general costs jurisdiction exercised by the Court in ordinary civil litigation, where costs are commonly awarded to compensate the successful party. In contrast, Article 40A does not confer a general right to recover costs. Rather costs only become available where there has been conduct warranting criticism. For that reason, the Court concluded that the essential purpose of Article 40A is to sanction and deter unreasonable conduct. The trigger for the jurisdiction is not the success or failure in the litigation, but misconduct during the proceedings. The Court expressly noted that a successful party could, in principle, be ordered to pay costs if it had behaved in a manner described in Article 40A. That possibility is difficult to reconcile with a purely compensatory model and strongly supports the conclusion that the regime is intended to regulate behaviour rather than simply reimburse expenditure.
The Court acknowledged that a costs award under Article 40A retains certain compensatory characteristics. Costs must actually have been incurred, the award cannot exceed £10,000.00, and the Tribunal must consider the paying party’s ability to meet the award. However, these features were characterised as limitations on the exercise of the power rather than indicators of its purpose. In the Court’s view they do not alter the fact that the jurisdiction exists principally to punish and deter unacceptable litigation conduct.
In respect of the Tribunal’s requirement that a party must demonstrate wasted costs, the Court emphasised that Article 40A creates an indemnity costs jurisdiction, not a wasted costs jurisdiction. Wasted costs orders are a specialised remedy typically directed against legal representatives whose conduct has unnecessarily increased the costs of litigation. Such orders require a distinct statutory basis and are subject to particular procedural safeguards because of their potentially serious consequences. Article 40A contains no such language and confers no equivalent jurisdiction.
From a practical perspective, this decision is likely to strengthen the effectiveness of the Tribunal’s costs jurisdiction. Parties can no longer assume that costs applications will be confined to reimbursement of specifically identifiable wasted expenditure. Instead the focus will be on whether a party’s conduct reaches the statutory threshold of being vexatious, abusive, disruptive, or otherwise unreasonable. Where that threshold is met, the Tribunal has a broader discretion to impose a costs sanction designed to deter such behaviour in future proceedings.
This is a significant authority on the interpretation of the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal’s (the Tribunal) recently introduced costs jurisdiction. Whilst the appeal arose from a costs dispute following an unsuccessful unfair dismissal and discrimination claims, its importance extends far beyond the immediate facts. The judgment represents the Court’s consideration of Article 40A of the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal (Procedure) (Jersey) Order 2016 (Article 40A) and establishes the principles that will govern future applications for costs before the Tribunal.
The background to the appeal was unusual. Following the Tribunal’s substantive decision, both parties sought costs under the newly enacted Article 40A. The Tribunal refused both applications. Thereafter the parties settled not only the substantive litigation but also the costs dispute itself. Nevertheless the States Employment Board elected to pursue the appeal on a pure question of law because, as Jersey’s largest employer, it considered clarification of the new costs regime to be a matter of wider public importance.
The appeal focused on two related findings in the Tribunal’s costs decision. First, the Tribunal held that Article 40A created a cost regime that was compensatory and not punitive. Secondly, it held that a party seeking costs was required to demonstrate that it had identifiable wasted costs as a result of the other party’s conduct. These findings led the Tribunal to reject elements of the States Employment Board’s costs claim because the States Employment Board had not isolated and quantified specific wasted expenditure.
The Court held that both propositions were errors of law. The Court considered the language of Article 40A itself. It noted that it permits the Tribunal to only award costs where a party or representative has acted “vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably” in bringing or conducting proceedings. The Court observed that this is fundamentally different from the general costs jurisdiction exercised by the Court in ordinary civil litigation, where costs are commonly awarded to compensate the successful party. In contrast, Article 40A does not confer a general right to recover costs. Rather costs only become available where there has been conduct warranting criticism. For that reason, the Court concluded that the essential purpose of Article 40A is to sanction and deter unreasonable conduct. The trigger for the jurisdiction is not the success or failure in the litigation, but misconduct during the proceedings. The Court expressly noted that a successful party could, in principle, be ordered to pay costs if it had behaved in a manner described in Article 40A. That possibility is difficult to reconcile with a purely compensatory model and strongly supports the conclusion that the regime is intended to regulate behaviour rather than simply reimburse expenditure.
The Court acknowledged that a costs award under Article 40A retains certain compensatory characteristics. Costs must actually have been incurred, the award cannot exceed £10,000.00, and the Tribunal must consider the paying party’s ability to meet the award. However, these features were characterised as limitations on the exercise of the power rather than indicators of its purpose. In the Court’s view they do not alter the fact that the jurisdiction exists principally to punish and deter unacceptable litigation conduct.
In respect of the Tribunal’s requirement that a party must demonstrate wasted costs, the Court emphasised that Article 40A creates an indemnity costs jurisdiction, not a wasted costs jurisdiction. Wasted costs orders are a specialised remedy typically directed against legal representatives whose conduct has unnecessarily increased the costs of litigation. Such orders require a distinct statutory basis and are subject to particular procedural safeguards because of their potentially serious consequences. Article 40A contains no such language and confers no equivalent jurisdiction.
From a practical perspective, this decision is likely to strengthen the effectiveness of the Tribunal’s costs jurisdiction. Parties can no longer assume that costs applications will be confined to reimbursement of specifically identifiable wasted expenditure. Instead the focus will be on whether a party’s conduct reaches the statutory threshold of being vexatious, abusive, disruptive, or otherwise unreasonable. Where that threshold is met, the Tribunal has a broader discretion to impose a costs sanction designed to deter such behaviour in future proceedings.